Ivan Dimkovic:Mrsh bre... sve su ovo posledice bolesnika G.W. Bush-a i njegove globalne kampanje sirenja paranoje. Englezi su i ovako i onako navikli da im drzava zaviruje u licne stvari... ali se iskreno nadam da ce neko ovo skrsiti na EU nivou.

Inace tako se uvode stvari na "mala vrata" - prvo "samo testovi", pa onda "nije obavezno, mozete da odbijete" pa to polako prelazi u "ko odbije, postaje sumnjiv" i na kraju - "slikanje, bez alternative... mislite na decu i vasu sigurnost!"

If there’s an “employee of the month” award for terrorists, then this guy in the picture on the left should win it hands down.

Suicide bomber Abdullah Hassan Tali al-Asiri had set out to kill Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef of Saudi Arabia. His plan was deviously clever, to say the least.

First he informed the prince that he had turned his back on terrorism, and proceeded to set up a meeting with Prince Nayef, who just happens to be the head of the security service in Saudi Arabia.

After clearing the security checks and getting into Nayef’s office, Al-Asiri pulled the old switcheroo, and detonated explosives he had smuggled in…hidden inside his butt.

milanche: Tek se spremaju zanimljive stvari na check point-ima od kada je onaj jedan terorista usao sa bombom sakrivenom u anusu.

Ivan Dimkovic: Nemam ja problema sa patkom - mogu da je gledaju na aerodromu, ali iskljucivo osobe zenskog pola i za to ima da plate :)

Ivan Dimkovic:iako je dokazano da su fingerprint skenovi vrlo nepouzdani

Horvat: na sta konkretno mislis?

Fingerprint Lock

Fingerprint readers take a sample of a fingerprint and match it with an approved-person database. The particular door-mounted scanner tested optically samples the fingerprint, and also had some extra "liveness-sensing" features that supposedly looks for pulse, body heat, and sweat. The optical fingerprint reader the MythBusters installed can be fooled by...
Myth statement Status Notes
...a copy of an approved fingerprint etched in latex. Confirmed Licking the latex sample (to simulate sweat) was enough to fool the scanner.
...a ballistics gel copy of an approved fingerprint. Confirmed Licking the gel sample (to simulate sweat) was enough to fool the scanner.
...a paper copy of an approved fingerprint. Confirmed Licking the paper sample (to simulate sweat) was enough to fool the scanner.

security theater consists of security countermeasures intended to provide the feeling of improved security while doing little or nothing to actually improve security.[1] The term was coined by Bruce Schneier for his book Beyond Fear,[2] but has gained currency in security circles, particularly for describing airport security measures. It is also used by some experts such as Edward Felten[3] to describe the security measures imposed after the September 11 attacks. Security theater gains importance both by satisfying and exploiting the gap between perceived risk and actual risk.

....
Security theater has real monetary costs but does not necessarily provide tangible security benefits. Security theater typically involves restricting certain aspects of people's behaviour in very visible ways, that could involve potential restrictions of personal liberty and privacy, ranging from negligible (where bottled water can be purchased) to significant (prolonged screening of individuals to the point of harassment).

The direct costs of security theater may be lower than that of more elaborate security measures. However, it may divert portions of the budget for effective security measures without resulting in adequate, measurable gain in security.[4] In many cases, intrusive security theater measures also create secondary negative effects whose real cost is hard to quantify and likely to dwarf the direct expenses.[citation needed]

Such ripple effects are often connected to fear; visible measures such as armed guards and highly intrusive security measures may lead people to believe that there must be a real risk associated with their activity. Other reasons for ripple effects may be that people are simply unwilling to undergo such intrusions as would be required for some activity by the security measures imposed on it.

An example for both issues is that after a recent increase in restrictions in air travel, many frequent air travellers have expressed that they will try to avoid flying in the future. Incongruously, car travel, which is often considered as the alternative, is in fact riskier than air travel.[5]

Security theater encourages people to make uninformed, counterproductive political decisions.[citation needed] The feeling of (and wish for) safety can actually increase the real risk.

The disruption, cost, and fear caused by security theater acts as positive feedback for those who wish to exploit it: even if they fail to take lives, they can cause large economic costs.

Security theater is a component of the culture of fear.[citation needed]

Critics such as the American Civil Liberties Union have pointed out that the benefits of security theater are temporary and illusory since after such security measures inevitably fail, not only is the feeling of insecurity increased, but there is also loss of belief in the competence of those responsible for security.